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Note 
The Implications of Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com 
on Copyright Registration 
LAUREN N. ROSS 
This Note addresses the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision, Fourth 
Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, and analyzes the Court’s decision 
in light of the relevant sections of the Copyright Act, the underlying circuit split, 
briefs submitted to the Court, and the oral argument before the Supreme Court. This 
Note argues that in response to the Supreme Court’s decision, Congress should 
amend the Copyright Act to codify the special handling process in order to create a 
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The Implications of Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com 
on Copyright Registration 
LAUREN N. ROSS * 
INTRODUCTION 
The copyright system is comprised of “procedural mechanisms, referred 
to collectively as ‘copyright formalities.’”1 Through the Copyright Acts of 
1909 and 1976, Congress moved the copyright system away from formalities 
by relaxing many of the requirements with which artists and creators needed 
to comply.2 However, registration has remained a requirement under the 
Copyright Act (the “Act”).3 The United States Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com, which requires the Register of 
Copyrights to act on a copyright owner’s application for registration before 
a civil action may commence,4 resolved a long-standing circuit split 
surrounding copyright registration5 and signals a shift back towards a 
copyright system predicated on formalities. 
The Act automatically grants copyright protection to an original work 
without any action on behalf of the creator.6 “[T]he Copyright Act 
safeguards copyright owners, irrespective of registration, by vesting them 
with exclusive rights upon creation of their works and prohibiting 
infringement from that point forward.”7 While the Act provides copyright 
owners a shield, restricting how others may use an original work, creators 
are not automatically provided a sword, or remedies, to protect their works. 
In order to pursue a civil action against an infringer, the work must be 
registered with the Copyright Office.8 Since the copyright system must 
                                                                                                                     
* University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. 2020. I would like to thank Professor Steven Wilf 
and the Connecticut Law Review. 
1 Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 487 (2004). 
2 See Sprigman, supra note 1, at 493–94 (noting that the 1909 Act lengthened the renewal term and 
“softened” the registration requirement to some degree). 
3 Jessica Litman, Argument Preview: When Has Registration of a Copyright Claim “Been Made”?, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 3, 2019, 10:10 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/01/argument-preview-
when-has-registration-of-a-copyright-claim-been-made/ (“Congress has significantly relaxed the 
formalities required for copyright protection, but it has retained registration as a key part of the legal 
regime.”).  
4 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 892 (2019). 
5 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.16(B)(3)(b)(iii) (2018). 
6 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (affording protection when the work is fixed in a tangible medium). 
7 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 891. This exclusive bundle of rights includes 
reproduction, preparation of derivative works, distribution, performance, and recording. § 106. 
8 § 411(a). 
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balance important rights and exceptions,9 owners of original works need to 
register with the Copyright Office to take advantage of these exclusive 
rights. However, the definition of “registration” was not clearly articulated 
by the Court until its decision in Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com. 
Ultimately, the Act has not worked in a manner Congress likely 
intended.10 The internet allows for the dissemination of more information 
than ever before and has made copying even easier.11 Additionally, delays 
within the Copyright Office have detrimentally impacted the effectiveness 
of the Office, thereby impeding the purpose of the Act. Copyright owners 
need a system that ensures not only that their works are protected, but also 
provides them with remedies that allow them to recover against infringers 
without unnecessary obstacles or delays. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Fourth Estate v. 
Wall-Street.com with the purpose of resolving the circuit split regarding 
when registration occurs under section 411(a) of the Act.12 The relevant 
portion of section 411(a) states: 
[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in any 
United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or 
registration of the copyright claim has been made in 
accordance with this title. In any case, however, where the 
deposit, application, and fee required for registration have 
been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and 
registration has been refused, the applicant is entitled to 
institute a civil action for infringement if notice thereof, with 
a copy of the complaint, is served on the Register of 
Copyrights. The Register may, at his or her option, become a 
party to the action with respect to the issue of 
registrability . . . .13  
The Court contemplated the meaning of “registration” within section 
411(a) of the Act and considered: 
[w]hether “registration of [a] copyright claim has been made” 
within the meaning of § 411(a) when the copyright holder 
                                                                                                                     
9 THE DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, WHITE PAPER ON REMIXES, FIRST 
SALE, AND STATUTORY DAMAGES: COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL 
ECONOMY i (2016). 
10 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 892 (“[T]he statutory scheme [of the Act] has not 
worked as Congress likely envisioned.”). 
11 KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION 
SPARKS INNOVATION 68 (2012); see also Sprigman, supra note 1, at 489 (contending that Congress could 
not predict how the growth of the internet would impact the copyright system and Congress did not 
consider this when removing many of the formalities from the copyright regime). 
12 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 887. 
13 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2012). 
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delivers the required application, deposit, and fee to the 
Copyright Office, as the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have held, or 
only once the Copyright Office acts on that application, as the 
Tenth Circuit and, in the decision below, the Eleventh Circuit 
have held.14  
The Court’s unanimous decision, written by Justice Ginsburg, ended the 
long-standing circuit split on copyright registration.15 The Court held “that 
‘registration . . . has been made’ within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) 
not when an application for registration is filed, but when the Register has 
registered a copyright after examining a properly filed application.”16 While 
this decision resolved the conflicting interpretations of the term 
“registration,” it is a fundamentally unjust decision and will inevitably create 
several obstacles for copyright owners seeking to protect their works against 
infringers. 
This Note will examine the Supreme Court’s decision in Fourth Estate 
v. Wall-Street.com and argue that the adoption of the registration approach 
is a shift back towards a copyright system based on formalities, which will 
result in an adverse and inequitable system for copyright owners. As a result, 
Congress should amend the Act to create a semi-conditional registration 
system that incorporates the Copyright Office’s special handling process. 
The first section of this Note will briefly describe the formal requirements 
mandated by early iterations of the Act and the relevant sections of the 
modern Act that pertain to registration. The second section will analyze the 
circuit split that led to the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in this case 
and the history of Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com. The third section will 
consider the briefs and oral arguments submitted by each party to the 
Supreme Court. The fourth section will focus on the Supreme Court’s 
decision and the likely consequences of the decision. The fifth section will 
present a possible solution through the adoption of a semi-conditional 
copyright system. 
I. THE COPYRIGHT ACT 
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the authority “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”17 Through this grant of power, Congress enacted the 
                                                                                                                     
14 Brief for Petitioner at i, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 
881 (2019) (No. 17-571) (citation omitted). 
15 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.16(B)(3)(b)(iii) (2018). 
16 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 892. 
17 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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Copyright Act.18 The Act requires creators to comply with several 
procedural requirements, or formalities, in order to obtain full copyright 
protection.19 The copyright system can function in two ways: in an 
unconditional system, which “grants protection whether or not the work is 
registered, marked, or renewed,” or in a conditional system, which requires 
the author or creator to take affirmative steps to protect their works.20 
A. The Evolution of the Copyright Act 
The first copyright legislation adopted by Congress, the Copyright Act 
of 1790, imposed strict formalities that only granted rights to authors in the 
United States.21 Unlike the current system, copyright protection was not 
automatically granted under the first Act.22 Instead, authors were required to 
comply with several strict formalities, including registering their works with 
district courts.23 Other formalities included providing notice and deposit, as 
well as complying with renewal requirements.24 The revisions of the 
Copyright Acts of 1909 and 1976, which relaxed several of these strict 
formalities, began the shift to what Professor Sprigman refers to as an 
“unconditional copyright” system.25 
Over time, the legislature removed many of the formal requirements 
imposed by previous iterations of the Act.26 Through the Copyright Act of 
1976, “Congress pared back, and in some instances entirely discarded, 
copyright formalities.”27 Through these acts the legislature adopted a more 
flexible copyright system.28 However, registration has consistently been 
required throughout iterations of copyright acts. 
                                                                                                                     
18 Guy A. Rub, A Less-Formalistic Copyright Preemption, 24 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 327, 329 (2017). 
However, it remains unclear what actions taken by Congress “promote progress.” Sprigman, supra note 
1, at 530. 
19 Sprigman, supra note 1, at 528 (“[F]ormalities are an important component of our original 
constitutional commitment to a utilitarian model of copyright.”). 
20 Id. at 494. 
21 Id. at 491–92. 
22 Id. But see 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (granting a work copyright protection when the work is 
“fixed in any tangible medium of expression”). 
23 Sprigman, supra note 1, at 492. 
24 Id.  
25 Id. at 493–94 (arguing that while still requiring registration, notice, and renewal, the registration 
requirement was softened). Sprigman compares the “unconditional copyright” system to a “conditional 
copyright” system, mandating these formal requirements. Id. at 494.  
26 See, e.g., Arthur J. Levine & Jeffrey L. Squires, Notice, Deposit and Registration: The 
Importance of Being Formal, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1232, 1239 (1977) (describing how to comply with 
notice requirements under the modern Act and how these requirements differ from the 1909 Act). 
27 Sprigman, supra note 1, at 487. 
28 Levine & Squires, supra note 26, at 1236. “The provisions of . . . the 1976 Act are generally 
intended to liberalize the rigid formalities which condition the acquisition of copyright under the old law, 
and which have from time to time resulted in unintended forfeitures of copyright.” Id. at 1232. 
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B. The Modern Copyright Act 
The Act provides a bundle of exclusive rights to creators of original 
literary, musical, dramatic, choreographic, pictorial, video, sound, and 
architectural works.29 Section 102 of the Act automatically grants a work 
copyright protection when the work is “fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression.”30 The bundle of exclusive rights copyright owners are afforded 
include the right to reproduce, prepare derivatives, perform, display, or 
distribute copies of their work.31 These rights are granted regardless of 
whether registration with the Copyright Office occurred. 
Congress assigned the Copyright Office the important task of registering 
copyright claims.32 Copyright registration is addressed in sections 408 
through 412 of the Act.33 Sections 408 and 409 of the Act describe the 
registration process and the required materials that creators must submit to 
the Register of Copyrights.34 The Act is silent on what occurs in the period 
of time between filing an application and when the Copyright Office 
completes registration. Section 410 only speaks to what occurs after an 
application for registration is examined or a work is registered.35 Copyright 
owners remain in a “legal limbo” until the Copyright Office issues 
registration or refuses an application for registration.36 
Registration of a work with the Copyright Office is “not a condition of 
copyright protection.”37 Section 408 states that a copyright owner may file 
an application with the Copyright Office.38 The Register of Copyrights (the 
“Register”) plays an important role in this process. The Register determines 
the form that must be used and has the authority to grant or refuse 
registration of any copyright claim filed.39 The Register also has the ability 
                                                                                                                     
29 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
30 § 102(a). 
31 § 106. 
32 Registration Modernization, 83 Fed. Reg. 201 (proposed Oct. 17, 2018) (to be codified at 37 
C.F.R. pt. 201–02) (“Copyright registration provides essential benefits for copyright owners.”). 
33 Section 101 of the Act defines “registration” as “a registration of a claim in the original or the 
renewed and extended term of copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). This definition is circular and does 
not provide a clear resolution to when registration occurs. 
34 17 U.S.C. §§ 408, 409 (2012) (requiring a deposit, application, and fee).  
35 § 410. 
36 Jason S. Duey, What’s the Problem Money Can’t Solve?: Why Determining the Validity of a 
Copyright Application Is a Clear Precondition to an Infringement Action, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 555, 
557 (2013) (describing legal limbo as the “time in space between delivering a validly complied copyright 
application with the Copyright Office and the Register of Copyrights issuing, or refusing to issue, a 
certificate of registration”). See infra Section V.A (explaining the consequences of “legal limbo”). 
37 § 408(a); 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.16(A)(1) (2018) (“[C]opyright automatically inheres in 
a work the moment it is ‘created.’”). 
38 § 408(a) (requiring deposit, application, and fee). The Copyright Office defines “deposit” as a 
copy “of the work to be registered for copyright.” Definitions, COPYRIGHT.GOV, 
https://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/definitions.html (last visited July 20, 2019). 
39 §§ 409, 410. 
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to become a party in an action regarding the registrability of a copyright 
claim.40 Consequently, the Register’s decision to issue a certificate of 
registration or deny an application can have significant implications on 
pending litigation.41 
It is important to note that the effective date of a copyright certificate is 
not the date on which the Register determines whether the claim should be 
approved or denied. Instead, the “effective date of a copyright registration is 
the day on which an application, deposit, and fee . . . have all been received 
in the Copyright Office.”42 This suggests that the date the application is filed 
is more significant than the date the Register grants certification. 
Section 411 of the Copyright Act requires a copyright holder to 
preregister or register their work before an action for infringement may be 
filed.43 Under section 408(f), “owners of works especially susceptible to 
prepublication infringement should be allowed to institute suit before the 
Register has granted or refused registration.”44 The language of this section 
was pivotal in the Court’s decision in Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com.45 
Some argue that the language of section 411 is clear: creators must 
register with the Copyright Office before they can file a copyright 
infringement suit.46 The Copyright Office takes this position.47 However, 
others argue that the term “registration” is ambiguous,48 giving rise to the 
circuit split and the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Fourth Estate v. 
Wall-Street.com. 
                                                                                                                     
40 § 411(a). 
41 Marybeth Peters, The Copyright Office and the Formal Requirements of Registration of Claims 
to Copyright, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 737, 739 (1992) (stating a certificate of registration may have a 
great influence in litigation). 
42 § 410(d). 
43 § 411(a). 
44 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 892 (2019). However, 
neither the Supreme Court nor the Copyright Act explicitly suggest what types of work may be 
preregistered. 
45 For a discussion of this decision, see infra Section IV. 
46 See, e.g., Duey, supra note 36, at 561 (“A copyright is registered only after the Copyright Office 
first determines the validity of an application and issues a certificate of registration. . . . [T]he statute is 
unambiguous . . . .”). 
47 Registration Modernization, 83 Fed. Reg. 201 (proposed Oct. 17, 2018) (to be codified at 37 
C.F.R. pt. 201–02). 
48 See, e.g., Emily B. Tate, Comment, No Public Benefits for Public Benefit: The Eleventh Circuit’s 
Narrow Approach to Copyright Registration, 59 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 134, 135–36 (2018) 
(“Section 411(a)’s fluid use of the word ‘registration’ has created tension in the courts, as the statute can 
be construed to refer simultaneously to the entire act of registration . . . and to the single act of filing with 
the Copyright Office . . . .”). 
 
 
2020] THE IMPLICATIONS OF FOURTH ESTATE V. WALL-STREET.COM 459 
II. THE HISTORY OF FOURTH ESTATE V. WALL-STREET.COM AND THE 
CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The long-standing circuit split surrounding copyright registration was 
imperative in the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari,49 and without the 
Court’s review of this issue, it was unlikely that the circuit split would have 
been resolved.50 There were formerly two approaches taken by circuit courts 
regarding copyright registration. The first was the registration approach, 
adopted by the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits.51 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits 
adopted the application approach.52 The circuit split was the result of courts 
interpreting the same, precise language of the Copyright Act regarding 
registration in two distinct ways.53 
A. The History of Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com and the Registration 
Approach 
The registration approach, adopted by the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, 
requires an applicant to show that the Copyright Office issued or rejected an 
application for certification before the copyright owner can bring a suit for 
copyright infringement.54 The registration approach requires compliance 
with strict registration formalities and directs the copyright system towards 
a conditional copyright approach. 
In Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com, the Eleventh Circuit held copyright 
registration occurs when the Copyright Office registers the claim.55 Fourth 
Estate filed a complaint against Wall-Street.com for copyright 
infringement56 after Wall-Street published material on its website that 
                                                                                                                     
49 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.16(B)(3)(b)(iii) (2018); See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Measuring 
Circuit Splits: A Cautionary Note, 3 J. LEGAL METRICS 361, 361 (2014) (“[A] split of authority is 
probably the single most important factor in triggering Supreme Court review.”). 
50 See Brief of The Copyright Alliance as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, Fourth Estate 
Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571) (praising the Court for 
resolving the circuit split). 
51 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 856 F.3d 1338, 1339–40 (11th Cir. 
2017); Tate, supra note 48, at 138. 
52 Tate, supra note 48, at 138. 
53 The Supreme Court has in the past affirmed the Eleventh Circuit in 47.4% of cases that have been 
granted certiorari, while the Court has affirmed the Fifth and Ninth Circuits 22.2% and 10.8%, 
respectively. Eric Hansford, Note, Measuring the Effects of Specialization with Circuit Split Resolutions, 
63 STAN. L. REV. 1145, 1165 (2011). 
54 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 856 F.3d at 1340. 
55 Id. at 1339. Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation is an organization that advocates for free 
press and promotes public interest and journalism. Our Vision, Mission & Values, FOURTH EST., 
https://www.fourthestate.org/mission-vision-values-beliefs/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2019). The 
organization also uses litigation as a strategy to propel their mission. Public Policy Advocacy, FOURTH 
EST., https://www.fourthestate.org/public-policy-advocacy/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2019). 
56 A claim for copyright infringement “occurs when a copyrighted work is reproduced, distributed, 
performed, publicly displayed, or made into a derivative work without the permission of the copyright 
owner.” Definitions, COPYRIGHT.GOV, https://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-definitions.html (last 
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Fourth Estate owned without proper licensure.57 Fourth Estate filed an 
application for registration with the Register but did not have a certificate 
from the Copyright Office before filing the action against Wall-Street.58  
The Eleventh Circuit held the defendant’s rationale under the 
registration approach was the correct interpretation of section 411(a) and 
that the text of the Act was unambiguous.59 In reaching its conclusion, the 
court relied on the language of section 410(a), which states “after 
examination, the Register of Copyrights determines that . . . [if] the material 
deposited constitutes copyrightable subject matter . . . , the Register shall 
register the claim and issue to the applicant a certificate of registration under 
the seal of the Copyright Office.”60 Therefore, the court held “[f]iling an 
application does not amount to registration.”61 
B. The Application Approach 
The application approach, adopted by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits,62 
focused on the copyright owner’s action of filing the application and paying 
the required fees in order to bring a suit for copyright infringement, rather 
than the steps taken by the Copyright Office.63 The application approach 
leans towards a more flexible copyright system. 
In Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp., the Ninth Circuit 
considered whether a district court erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s 
copyright infringement action because it allegedly failed to satisfy section 
411(a) of the Copyright Act.64 Prior to filing suit, Cosmetic submitted an 
application for copyright registration to the Copyright Office, but had not 
yet heard from the Office regarding whether its application was approved.65 
The Ninth Circuit considered what “registration” means within the larger 
context of the Act.66 The court considered both the application and 
                                                                                                                     
visited Mar. 21, 2019). To prevail on a claim of copyright infringement, the copyright owner must prove 
both “[o]wnership of a valid copyright in the work” and “the defendant copied the work.” PRACTICAL 
LAW INTELLECTUAL PROP. & TECH., COPYRIGHT: OVERVIEW, Westlaw (last updated 2018). There is a 
three-year statute of limitations. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2012). 
57 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 856 F.3d at 1339. “[L]icensing is a crucial mechanism for 
transferring rights from authors to [other] entities . . . .” Sprigman, supra note 1, at 502. Wall-Street.com 
provides information relating to the financial sector, stocks, and news. WALL-STREET.COM, https://wall-
street.com (last visited Mar. 21, 2019). 
58 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 887 (2019). 
59 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 856 F.3d at 1340–42. 
60 17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
61 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 856 F.3d at 1341. 
62 Id. at 1340. 
63 Id. 
64 606 F.3d 612, 613–14 (9th Cir. 2010). 
65 Id. at 614. 
66 Id. at 615. 
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registration approaches and recognized the circuit split on this issue.67 Since 
litigation began, the Copyright Office issued a certificate of registration to 
the plaintiff.68 The circuit court focused on the language of section 411(a) 
and stated that “registration” is not well defined in the Act.69 Therefore, the 
court interpreted multiple sections of the Act in order to get guidance on the 
appropriate definition of “registration.”70 The court noted that if section 
410(a) or section 411(a) are considered alone, it appears that the Register 
has an active role that requires action in order to complete registration.71 
However, when considered alongside sections 408 and 410(d), it seems that 
the intention of Congress was to follow the application approach.72 In 
addition to considering the language of the Copyright Act, the Ninth Circuit 
also contemplated Congress’ intent in passing the Act. The court held that 
the “application approach better fulfill[ed] Congress’s purpose of providing 
broad copyright protection while maintaining a robust federal register.”73  
The Fifth Circuit, in Positive Black Talk Inc. v. Cash Money Records 
Inc., relied on the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Cosmetic Ideas and concluded 
that “technicalities should not prevent litigants from having their cases heard 
on the merits.”74 The Fifth Circuit adopted the application approach through 
this opinion. 
Ultimately, the facts surrounding Fourth Estate’s claim are different 
from the facts in Cosmetic Ideas. Unlike Cosmetic, Fourth Estate did not 
receive confirmation from the Copyright Office regarding the status of its 
application when it appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.75 Therefore, the 
Eleventh Circuit did not have the same benefit the Ninth Circuit had—
holding a valid copyright registration. However, the Ninth and Fifth Circuits 
provided the Supreme Court with a strong statutory analysis that could have 
been used as a baseline for its decision in Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com. 
Further, both the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit considered the language 
of the Act regarding the definition of “registration” to be ambiguous.76 
                                                                                                                     
67 Id. at 615–16. 
68 Id. at 616. Registration with the Copyright Office is prima facie evidence of a valid copyright. 
17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2012). 
69 Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 616. 
70 Id. (“[R]ather than focusing just on the word or phrase at issue, this court looks to the entire 
statute to determine . . . intent.”). 
71 Id. at 617. 
72 Id. (“[Section 408] implies that the sole requirement for obtaining registration is delivery of the 
appropriate documents and fee.”). 
73 Id. at 619. 
74 Positive Black Talk Inc. v. Cash Money Records Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 366 (5th Cir. 2004). 
75 In fact, Fourth Estate’s application was significantly delayed. See Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit 
Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 887 n.2 (2019) (“Consideration of Fourth Estate’s filings 
was initially delayed because the check Fourth Estate sent in payment of the filing fee was rejected by 
Fourth Estate’s bank as uncollectible.”). 
76 See Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 618; Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit 
Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571) (“[R]egistration could mean either.”). 
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Since arguing before the Eleventh Circuit, Fourth Estate’s application 
for copyright registration was denied.77 The Register found that Fourth 
Estate failed to meet the group database registration requirements.78 
However, the Register’s decision did not impact the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction over this case. First, the defendant prevailed on its motion to 
dismiss, depriving the petitioner the opportunity to present evidence as to 
why its application for copyright should have been approved. Second, the 
Register’s denial of a copyright application does not deprive the petitioner 
its day in court under section 411(a). While this section may now require 
that the Register approve or deny issuing a certificate of copyright, it does 
not require that the Register issue a certificate in order to bring suit.79 The 
Register also has the option to become a party in an action regarding the 
registrability of a copyright claim.80 
III. THE APPEAL TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
The Supreme Court previously acknowledged the circuit split regarding 
copyright registration but has refused to address this issue until granting 
certiorari in Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com.81 In Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. 
Muchnick, the Court considered “whether [section] 411(a) . . . deprives 
federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate infringement 
claims involving unregistered works.”82 The Court conducted a close 
reading of section 411(a) and considered the legislative intent in drafting the 
statute.83 The Court held that registration is not a condition to jurisdiction.84 
However, the Court did not reach the issue of defining “registration” as 
applied to section 411.85 While this decision signaled that the copyright 
                                                                                                                     
77 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 10, Fourth Estate Pub. 
Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571). Fourth Estate’s application 
was delayed because of a check that was uncollectible. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 
887 n.2.  
78 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 77, at 3a–7a 
(citing lack of originality in arranging materials). A single application for registration may be submitted 
for a group of works created by the same author and published in a periodical or newspaper in the same 
year. 17 U.S.C. § 408(c) (2012). 
79 § 411(a). 
80 Id. 
81 The Court acknowledged the circuit split early in the Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com decision, 
stating the purpose of granting certiorari in this case was to resolve the split. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit 
Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 887. 
82 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1242 (2010). 
83 Id. at 1245. 
84 Id. at 1246–47. 
85 Id. at 1249 (“We also decline to address whether § 411(a)’s registration requirement is a 
mandatory precondition to suit that . . . district courts may or should enforce sua sponte by dismissing 
copyright infringement claims involving unregistered works.”). However, had the Court addressed the 
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system was shifting further away from formal registration requirements and 
towards a semi-conditional copyright framework, the Court did not take the 
same approach when deciding Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com.  
On January 8, 2019, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Fourth 
Estate v. Wall-Street.com.86 Unlike the argument before the Eleventh 
Circuit,87 Justice Kagan noted that the term “registration” was flexible.88 The 
Court conducted a statutory analysis and focused on the language of the 
Copyright Act in order to determine how “registration” should be 
interpreted. 
A. Petitioner’s Brief and Argument Before the United States Supreme 
Court 
Justices of the Court agreed with Petitioner that the definition of 
“registration” was flexible89 and asserted “registration” could mean either 
the copyright owner’s application or the Copyright Office’s processing of 
the application.90 The Court’s acknowledgement that the term “registration” 
was vague was significant because this stance differed significantly from the 
Eleventh Circuit’s opinion. 
In Petitioner’s brief to the Supreme Court, Fourth Estate asserted that 
while a copyright owner must register its work with the Copyright Office in 
order to pursue a civil action, there is no requirement that the Copyright 
Office must act on that application prior to the copyright owner being able 
to protect its work against infringers through a civil action.91 Therefore, 
registration is not a precondition to copyright protection.92 Petitioner argued 
that when the three basic requirements for copyright protection—deposit, 
                                                                                                                     
86 Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 
139 S. Ct. 881, 887 (2019) (No. 17-571). 
87 The argument before the Eleventh Circuit, which took place on April 4, 2017, was vastly different 
from the argument before the Supreme Court. Instead of conducting a textual analysis, the Eleventh 
Circuit focused on precedent and cases that addressed similar issues. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s holding and stated “[f]iling an application does not amount to registration.” Fourth Estate 
Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 856 F.3d 1338, 1341 (11th Cir. 2017). 
88 Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 
139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 4. 
91 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 1, 18 (“[T]he registration requirement in § 411(a) imposes 
an obligation on the copyright owner to file for registration before initiating suit; it does not require any 
particular action by the Register.”). Therefore, Petitioner urges the Court to adopt the application 
approach. Several organizations supported Petitioner’s argument, including the American Bar 
Association, Copyright Alliance, National Music Publishers’ Association, Authors Guild and Other 
Artists Rights Organizations, and International Trademark Association. Search Results: Docket, No. 
17-571, U.S. SUP. CT., https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html 
/public/17-571.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2019) (listing the briefs amici curiae of the petitioner’s 
supporters). 
92 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 2, 18. 
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application, and fee—have been fulfilled, registration under section 411(a) 
is satisfied.93 
In its brief, Petitioner interpreted the Copyright Act as a whole, citing to 
several sections of the Act, and argued the terms “register” and 
“registration” have “substantial flexibility.”94 Section 408 states that “the 
owner of copyright . . . may obtain registration of the copyright claim by 
delivering to the Copyright Office the deposit specified by this section, 
together with the application and fee.”95 Nowhere in section 408 of the Act 
does it state that the Register must approve the application in order for it to 
take effect for purposes of filing actions for remedies. Additionally, based 
on the context of “register” in section 411, Petitioner argued that the word 
refers not to the actions of the Register, but to the actions of the copyright 
owner.96 Petitioner strengthened its argument by showing that the Register’s 
refusal to issue a certificate of registration to a copyright owner does not 
preclude the owner from being able to initiate an infringement action.97 
Therefore, regardless of whether the registration for copyright is granted or 
refused, the owner may still initiate a suit for infringement.98 
Further, Petitioner cited to several problems that would ensue and the 
obstacles copyright owners would face if the Court adopted the registration 
approach. Petitioner contended that if the Act was interpreted to require the 
Register to determine the copyrightability of a work prior to a copyright 
owner being able to bring an infringement suit, unnecessary delays would 
result.99 Petitioner also stated that the most significant problem a copyright 
holder will face is their inability to bring an action for injunctive relief, or 
any other kind of civil action, until the Register grants or refuses 
registration.100 “[T]he value of the copyright depends on the ability to 
exclude [the] unauthorized copying [or] reproduction of the work.”101 
Injunctive relief is important to a copyright owner because it can prevent 
wide dissemination of their work—which in turn reduces the value of the 
work—and it can be difficult to determine the amount of damages that 
should be awarded.102 
Fourth Estate also argued that the registration approach would be 
“inconsistent with the scheme of rights and remedies that the Copyright Act 
                                                                                                                     
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 28–29. 
95 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
96 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 29. 
97 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2012); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 29–30. 
98 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2012); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 10. 
99 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 12–14 (arguing there are delays due to a backlog in the 
Copyright Office). See infra Section V.A (discussing delays within the copyright system). 
100 Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 
139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571).  
101 Id. at 26. 
102 Id. at 27. 
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creates.”103 Petitioner distinguished the copyright system from the trademark 
and patent regimes, which have different registration requirements.104 
Applications for trademarks and patents involve a complex process that has 
“significant procedural formalities,”105 and unlike these two distinct 
regimes, copyright serves a different purpose.106 Therefore, unlike a 
trademark or patent, a copyright owner’s right to exclude does not require a 
certificate of registration.107 
B. Respondents’ Brief and Argument Before the United States Supreme 
Court 
Respondents argued that section 411(a) of the Act “is plain”108 and 
should be interpreted to mean registration must be made or refused before 
an infringement action may be instituted.109 Respondents urged the Court to 
consider these terms in “their ordinary, common-sense meaning,” in order 
to reach the conclusion that “registration” does not mean application.110 “The 
whole point of a registration decision, whether it’s a grant or a refusal . . . is 
a belief that there is a value to the registration process itself.”111 
Wall-Street.com cited to several benefits of registration, including providing 
                                                                                                                     
103 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 20–21, 37. 
104 Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 
139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571) (“[T]he Copyright Office is not the Patent Office. It does not grant 
exclusive rights that don’t exist before the Copyright Office acts.”). 
105 Jacob Harper, The United States Copyright Office: Nostalgia for the Past, Obstacle for the 
Future, 4 INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 29, 30 (2012). 
106 Id. at 32 (stating the Copyright Office’s mission is to “promote creativity by administering and 
sustaining an effective national copyright system”). 
107 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012); Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. 
v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571). 
108 Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 
139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571). 
109 Brief for the Respondents at 1, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 
S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571). Several organizations supported Respondents’ view, including Authors 
and Educators, Washington Legal Foundation, and Public Knowledge and the R Street Institute. Docket 
No. 17-571, U.S. SUP. CT., 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html%20/public/17-571.html 
(last visited Mar. 21, 2019). An amicus brief was also filed on behalf of the United States, which is 
supported by the General Counsel and Associate Register of Copyrights, Assistant General Counsel of 
the United States Copyright Office, and attorneys at the Department of Justice. Id. The Department of 
Justice’s support of Respondents’ brief is not surprising. In the Copyright Office’s 2017 Annual Report, 
the Office stated that it has “coordinated closely with the Department of Justice to defend the Office’s 
actions.” U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FISCAL 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 8, 
https://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2017/ar2017.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2019). 
110 Brief for the Respondents, supra note 109, at 15, 19. 
111 Transcript of Oral Argument at 34–35, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, 
LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571). 
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information to the public, creating a permanent record, incentivizing creators 
to register works early, and expanding the Library of Congress’ records.112  
Respondents also engaged in a close, textual analysis of section 411(a) 
and contended that the language of the Act clearly supports the registration 
approach.113 Respondents argued that the second sentence of section 411(a) 
is an exception to the first sentence, which showed Congress’ intent in 
requiring action by the Register.114 It also engaged in an analysis of other 
sections of the Act, such as sections 408, 409, and 410, to further support its 
definition of “registration.”115  
While Respondents acknowledged the concern surrounding processing 
of copyright claims, they minimized its impact.116 Respondents cited to 
budget cuts, staff vacancies, and lacking technology as reasons for delays in 
registering copyright claims.117 During oral argument, the Court stated that 
Congress did not intend for these delays.118 Respondents contended that 
works filed for preregistration or under an alternative special handling 
process are decided quickly and are not subjected to the same delays.119 
While delays in processing claims are one of the Copyright Office’s 
concerns, Respondents suggested that this issue should be left to Congress 
to resolve.120 
IV. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND THE LIKELY 
RESULTS 
The Supreme Court “conclude[d] that ‘registration . . . has been made’ 
within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) not when an application for 
registration is filed, but when the Register has registered a copyright after 
examining a properly filed application.”121 The Court’s decision clearly 
aligned with the registration approach and signals a shift back towards a 
conditional copyright, or copyright formalities, system. Ultimately, this 
decision will present several obstacles for copyright owners. 
                                                                                                                     
112 Brief for the Respondents, supra note 109, at 20; Transcript of Oral Argument at 49–50, Fourth 
Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571). 
113 Brief for the Respondents, supra note 109, at 14. 
114 Id. at 5; Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, 
LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571). 
115 Brief for the Respondents, supra note 109, at 14–15. 
116 Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 
139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571) (stating ninety-four percent of applications are resolved in two to 
fifteen months). 
117 Brief for the Respondents, supra note 109, at 4. 
118 Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 
139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571). 
119 Id. at 38, 40. 
120 Brief for the Respondents, supra note 109, at 33. 
121 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 892 (2019). 
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A. The Supreme Court’s Reasoning 
First, the Court delved into a textual analysis of the Copyright Act. 
While the Court recognized that exclusive rights are automatically granted 
to a copyright owner, it also pointed to section 408(f), which allows for 
preregistration. Under this provision, copyright owners may file a civil 
action for infringement before registering their work.122 However, 
preregistration is only available to works that are “vulnerable to 
predistribution infringement” and has historically applied to works in the 
film or music industries.123 Therefore, while the preregistration section of 
the Act does support the Court’s holding under the registration approach, 
Fourth Estate would not have likely been able to qualify its works for 
preregistration.124 Next, the Court considered the language of section 411(a) 
and stated that it focuses on the Copyright Office’s act of registration or 
refusal, not on the owner’s action of filing an application.125 Otherwise, 
different meanings of “registration” would have to be given to the term in 
the first and second sentences within the same section of the Act.126 
Additionally, the third sentence, which gives the Register the authority to 
intervene, would be negated.127 The Court then turned to other sections of 
the Act, stating that sections 410 and 408(f) both support its interpretation 
of “registration.”128 
Second, the Court stated that amendments to the Copyright Act and 
precedent were dispositive. The Court relied on the text of the statute that 
anteceded the modern section 411 and the Second Circuit’s holding in 
Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co. In 
Vacheron, the Second Circuit held that the Copyright Act precluded a 
copyright owner from bringing an action for infringement until a work was 
both deposited and registered.129 Congress responded to this decision by 
                                                                                                                     
122 Id. at 888 (noting that preregistration is just “a preliminary step prior to a full registration” and 
is not an exception to the general registration requirement). 
123 Id.  
124 The Court notes that preregistration is allowed for “exceptional scenarios,” making the 
availability of preregistration even narrower. Id. 
125 Id. at 888–89. 
126 Id. at 889. This analysis closely aligned with Respondents’ position and analysis of section 
411(a). Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 
139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571). 
127 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 889.  
128 Id. (relying on the Register’s role after examination of an application and the ability to preregister 
works).  
129 Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 F.2d 637, 640–41 
(2d Cir. 1958). “[T]he key issue that was debated between the majority opinion and the dissent in 
Vacheron [was] whether the copyright owner should be prevented from gaining access to judicial 
remedies because the Copyright Office had not yet acted or granted the registration.” Transcript of Oral 
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adding the second sentence of section 411(a), which allows an infringement 
suit to move forward, even if an application for registration was denied.130 
The parties disagree as to whether Congress’ response was a shift towards 
an unconditional or conditional copyright system. The Court rejected the 
argument that the amendment shifted registration away from formalities.131 
Lastly, the Court considered the legislative history and intent of section 
411(a).132 The Court stated that the amendments to the Act in 1976 
“reaffirmed the general rule that registration must precede an infringement 
suit, and added an exception” by adding the second sentence to section 
411(a).133 The Court also cited to rejected proposed amendments to section 
411(a), including a “proposal to allow suit immediately upon submission of 
a registration application.”134 “Time and again, then, Congress has 
maintained registration as prerequisite to suit, and rejected proposals that 
would have eliminated registration or tied it to the copyright claimant’s 
application instead of the Register’s action.”135 Instead, Congress addressed 
concerns by creating clear exceptions from section 411(a)’s registration 
requirement.136 
While the Supreme Court adopted the registration approach, the Court 
acknowledged the “unfortunate” outcome from this decision.137 The Court 
noted that the copyright system has not functioned in a way that Congress 
likely intended,138 and therefore Congress should respond. Moreover, there 
are several obstacles copyright owners who do not yet hold a certificate of 
registration will face if they are prevented from filing an infringement suit 
before a certificate is issued or denied. These concerns include significant 
delays, running of the statute of limitations, and severe economic impacts. 
Therefore, Congress should amend the Act to create an additional exception 
to section 411(a) by adopting the special handling process offered by the 
Copyright Office.139 
                                                                                                                     
130 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 891 n.5. 
131 Id. at 890–91. 
132 Id. “Time and again, then, Congress has maintained registration as prerequisite to suit, and 
rejected proposals that would have eliminated registration or tied it to the copyright claimant’s 
application instead of the Register’s action.” Id. at 891. 
133 Id. at 890–91. 
134 Id. at 891 (“[I]n years following the 1976 revisions, Congress resisted efforts to eliminate § 
411(a) and the registration requirement embedded in it.”). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 892 (providing examples such as section 408(f)’s preregistration option). 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 In fact, Respondents contended that Congress must amend the Copyright Act for a court to find 
that the application approach satisfies the registration requirement under section 411(a). Brief for the 
Respondents, supra note 109, at 42. 
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B. The Likely Ramifications of the Supreme Court’s Decisions 
1. Delays Within the Copyright System 
The largest impact of the Supreme Court’s decision is its implicit 
tolerance of the dysfunctional registration system. The Court characterized 
the Copyright Office’s delay in registering copyright applications as 
“unfortunate” and stated that the registration system has not worked as it 
was meant to.140 However, the Court left this issue for Congress to resolve. 
The Copyright Office is entrusted with the important responsibility of 
registering copyright claims.141 In 2018, the Copyright Office received over 
600,000 claims.142 In 2017, the Office received 539,662 claims and issued 
452,122 certificates of registration.143 According to the 2017 annual report 
published by the Copyright Office, 15,902 applications were not processed 
in the year they were filed.144 Due to the large volume of applications, “[i]t 
is therefore crucial that the Office have an innovative and modern copyright 
registration system that can meet the rapidly expanding needs of the highly 
diverse copyright community and the public at large.”145 It is clear that the 
Copyright Office cannot process applications as quickly as some copyright 
owners may need in order to pursue litigation. The Office recognized “that 
a delay in the issuance of a certificate may create difficulties for the 
copyright owner or other interested parties, particularly when litigation is 
expected.”146 The registration approach tolerates and creates further 
unnecessary delays within the system.147 The Copyright Office estimates the 
following processing times:148  
 
Type of Claim Average Processing Time 
Claims filed online with no 
correspondence 
Six months 
Claims filed by mail with no Thirteen months 
                                                                                                                     
140 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 892. Wall-Street.com acknowledged in its brief 
to the Supreme Court that the amount of time it takes for the Copyright Office to process an application 
for registration has fluctuated and varies. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 109, at 4 (“The pendency 
time for processing registration claims is a source of constant concern.”). 
141 Registration Modernization, 83 Fed. Reg. 52,336 (proposed Oct. 17, 2018) (to be codified at 37 
C.F.R. pt. 201–02) (“Copyright registration provides essential benefits for copyright owners.”). 
142 Id. at 52,337. 
143 Id. 
144 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 109, at 4 (reporting that the Registration Program received 
539,662 claims in fiscal year 2017 and closed 523,760). 
145 Registration Modernization, 83 Fed. Reg. at 52,337. 
146 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 623.1 (3d ed. 
2019) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM]. 
147 Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 619 (9th Cir. 2010); Brief for 
Petitioner, supra note 14, at 2. 
148 Registration Processing Times, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 
https://www.copyright.gov/registration/docs/processing-times-faqs.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2019). 
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correspondence 
Claims filed online with 
correspondence 
Nine months 




Therefore, on average, the process is likely to take nine to thirteen 
months.149 According to the Department of Justice, “[t]he examination 
process often involves a dialogue between the copyright office and the 
applicant,”150 which leads to increased processing time. Respondents stated 
that thirty percent of applications result in correspondence and the Office 
often requests changes to applications,151 which also suggests increased 
processing time. While there are alternatives, such as expedited review 
through the special handling process,152 not all copyright owners can afford 
additional fees.153 Despite these delays, ninety-seven percent of applications 
for registration are ultimately approved.154 
In addition to severe delays, the Copyright Office also fails to 
communicate with copyright owners during the application process.155 The 
Office does not have information available to applicants regarding the 
amount of time it will take to review an application or register a work.156 The 
period of time between the filing of copyright registration and the 
confirmation that registration is complete is referred to as “legal limbo.”157 
As a result, the copyright owner lacks important information it may need to 
                                                                                                                     
149 But see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 77, at 
5 (stating that “[t]he average time for the Copyright Office to resolve a registration application is 
approximately seven months”). 
150 Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
151 Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 
139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571). 
152 See infra Section V; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
supra note 77, at 5. 
153 Brief of the American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 28–29, Fourth Estate 
Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571) (“The net result is that 
authors who cannot afford the special handling fees may be deprived of the ability to obtain recourse for 
infringement of their rights.”). The special handling fee is $800 in addition to the general registration fee. 
Fees, COPYRIGHT.GOV, https://www.copyright.gov/about/fees.html (last visited July 20, 2019). 
154 Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 
139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571). 
155 According to the Copyright Office, there is no confirmation that an application for registration 
has been received. I’ve Submitted My Application, Fee, and Copy of My Work to the Copyright Office. 
Now What?, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., https://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-what.html#received (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2019). 
156 Id. 
157 Duey, supra note 36, at 557. See also Tate, supra note 48, at 144 (“[T]he copyright owner has 
no recourse against continuing harmful infringement.”). 
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protect its work. Fourth Estate stated that this period of “legal limbo” is the 
greatest concern for copyright owners.158 
The Copyright Office is taking several measures to improve its current 
application process.159 For instance, the Office is seeking to improve its 
technology, increase the types of documents it retains in its public database, 
and is considering implementing a system that offers varying amounts of 
support throughout the application process.160 These improvements would 
create more transparency in the registration process, simplify the application 
process, and likely improve the Copyright Office’s productivity, thereby 
reducing the amount of time it takes to process an application for copyright 
registration. However, until these changes are implemented, applicants will 
continue to be disadvantaged by delays and prejudiced by the lack of 
information available regarding their applications. 
The Supreme Court’s reaction to this issue was lacking. The Court cited 
to section 408(f), which allows preregistration for works that are susceptible 
to infringement.161 However, the works that qualify under section 408(f) are 
limited, as they must be the type “especially susceptible to prepublication 
infringement.”162 The Court left the administrative delays for Congress to 
resolve, stating it is not an issue the Court can address.163 
2. Access to Courts and Statute of Limitations 
The American Bar Association, in its amicus brief to the Supreme Court, 
asserted that the registration approach would be an obstacle to accessing 
courts.164 Since the Copyright Office does not provide applicants with status 
updates on their copyright registration applications, it could be conceivable 
that the statute of limitations may run on a claim prior to when the Copyright 
Office issues a certificate or rejects an application.165 In considering which 
approach to adopt, the Ninth Circuit stated that the registration approach 
could have the result of precluding a plaintiff from pursuing a claim due to 
the three-year statute of limitations.166 The circuit court also noted that the 
statute of limitations conflicts with the requirement under section 410(d) that 
                                                                                                                     
158 Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 
139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571). 
159 Registration Modernization, 83 Fed. Reg. 52,336 (proposed Oct. 17, 2018) (to be codified at 37 
C.F.R. pt. 201–02). 
160 Id. 
161 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 892 (2019). 
162 Id. Fourth Estate would not have likely qualified for preregistration under section 408(f). 
163 Id. at 892. 
164 Brief of the American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 153, at 3, 
29 (“The Copyright Office’s delay in deciding whether to issue or refuse to issue a certificate of 
registration also has consequences for meeting the short three-year statute of limitations under the 
Copyright Act.”). 
165 Tate, supra note 48, at 144. 
166 Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp., 606 F.3d 612, 620 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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the certificate is dated with the date of application, not the date of 
certification.167 
The Supreme Court responded to the Petitioner’s concern by asserting it 
was “overstated” because the average processing time is seven months.168 
The Court reasoned that there is “ample time to sue after the Register’s 
decision, even for infringement that began before submission of an 
application.”169 However, as previously stated, it may take much longer than 
seven months for the Register to act on an application.170  
3. Economic Impacts of the Supreme Court’s Decision 
The Court’s decision will have significant economic impacts on 
copyright owners. The Supreme Court reasoned that a copyright owner, once 
issued a certificate of registration, may “recover for infringement that 
occurred both before and after registration.”171 However, damages in an 
infringement suit are difficult to prove, and the infringement may not be 
discovered for a substantial period of time.172 Additionally, copyright 
owners will inevitably sustain further damages if they must wait until the 
Register acts on their application for copyright registration.173 These 
“bureaucratic delays” will “prevent a copyright owner from promptly 
enjoining infringement that may significantly undermine the value of its 
property.”174 It would also allow “an infringing party to continue to profit” 
from violating copyright law.175 This “uneconomic” approach is not in the 
interests of the litigating parties or the court system.176 
A possible benefit of the Court’s adoption of the registration approach 
is that it may encourage artists who anticipate returns on their works to 
register with the Copyright Office early.177 
The registration requirement thus encourage[s] authors to 
assess the value of their works prior to first publication. If the 
author expected the work to have a commercial value in excess 
of the time-adjusted cost of complying with registration and 
other formalities, he would take the steps necessary to obtain 
                                                                                                                     
167 Id. 
168 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 892. 
169 Id.  
170 See supra Section V.A (describing the amount of time it may take for the Copyright Office to 
process an application). 
171 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 881. 
172 Sprigman, supra note 1, at 513–14 n.97. 
173 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, 
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copyright protection. But if the costs of protection exceeded 
the expected revenues from copyrighting, the author would not 
register the work.178 
However, an artist cannot always predict the commercial success of its work. 
V. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION THROUGH THE SPECIAL HANDLING PROCESS 
The Supreme Court’s adoption of the registration approach in Fourth 
Estate v. Wall-Street.com is severely problematic for copyright owners and 
is fundamentally unjust. The Court acknowledged the “unfortunate” 
outcome of this case and several issues that will result from this conditional 
copyright approach, including delays within the copyright system, possible 
running of the statute of limitations, and economic impacts.179 However, the 
Court declined to directly address these problems and left them for Congress 
to resolve. 
Congress may address the inefficiencies within the copyright system and 
the outcome of Fourth Estate by amending the Act. Instead of viewing 
copyright as a conditional or unconditional system, Congress should amend 
the Act to create a semi-conditional copyright system. This approach would 
maintain the formal requirement of registration while providing copyright 
owners with a practical solution when they do not qualify for preregistration 
under section 408(f).  
Under the current Act, a court may not hear an infringement action and 
cannot issue an injunction until the Register has issued or rejected an 
application for copyright registration.180 However, under the Copyright 
Office’s Compendium, the Office permits copyright owners to file an 
application under an expedited application: the special handling process.181 
Congress has not adopted the Compendium as law. Rather, it is a guide for 
the Copyright Office.  
The “special handling [process] is a procedure for expediting the 
examination of an application to register a claim to copyright or the 
recordation of a document pertaining to copyright.”182 The Office may grant 
an application for special handling under limited circumstances, such as 
pending or prospective litigation, and charges an additional $800 fee for the 
expedited review in addition to the registration fee.183 The Office aims to 
review an application within five business days when filed under this 
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process.184 However, the Copyright Office may deny an application for 
special handling based on how busy the Office is or due to budget 
restraints.185  
Congress should adopt a modified version of section 623 of the 
Compendium, which outlines the special handling process, into the Act in 
order to codify a semi-conditional copyright system. Like section 408(f), this 
would provide another exception to the general registration requirement and 
allow parties anticipating litigation to pursue an infringement action in a 
timely manner. However, Congress should not allow the Office to decline 
review of an application under the expedited system due to the Office’s 
volume of applications.186 This would otherwise undermine the purpose of 
the special handling process and create uncertainty for applicants regarding 
whether and when their application would be processed. Additionally, 
Congress should explicitly state how section 623 would operate in litigation. 
Under the proposed semi-conditional system, a district court would grant a 
temporary restraining order, prohibiting the alleged infringer from 
continuing the infringing behavior until the copyright owner has an 
opportunity to amend its copyright registration application with the 
Copyright Office and request review under the special handling process.187 
This approach would limit the damages the copyright owner suffers, reduce 
litigation costs, and would resolve many of the concerns Petitioner in Fourth 
Estate and the Supreme Court acknowledge. 
First, the adoption of the special handling process into the Act would 
help to resolve the “legal limbo” concern as well as resolve some of the 
Copyright Office’s delays. By allowing a copyright owner to modify its 
application to pursue the special handling process, the copyright owner 
would not need to worry about waiting a significant amount of time for the 
Register to process an application and issue a certificate.188 Instead, the 
applicant would have a near-immediate decision from the Register. This 
approach would also increase communication between the copyright owner 
and the Office: the Office would be on notice of the litigation and may 
therefore gain more information about the work. 
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Second, the special handling process would preserve the registration 
requirement as a formality under the Act while maintaining access to 
courts.189 By expediting an application through the special handling process, 
the copyright owner would not be concerned about running into the statute 
of limitations, since a decision would be made within five business days.190 
As a result, the owner could commence an infringement action almost 
immediately and would not be prejudiced by the running of the statute of 
limitations. 
Finally, a semi-conditional copyright approach would resolve many of 
the uneconomic effects of the Court’s decision. It would allow the copyright 
owner to pursue an expedited review of its application for copyright, 
therefore mitigating the amount of damages the plaintiff would otherwise 
suffer in the number of months it would otherwise take the Copyright Office 
to act on its application. While the applicant may have to pay a fee in order 
to expedite an application,191 it would likely be less than what the applicant 
would suffer due to continued infringement. This approach would also 
reduce litigation costs, as the parties would be able to quickly adjudicate the 
infringement action. 
Through the adoption of the special handling process, Congress can 
relieve many of the concerns raised by Fourth Estate and circuit courts. The 
Compendium provides Congress a foundation upon which to build this semi-
conditional copyright system and would provide copyright owners with a 
sword to protect their works should litigation ensue. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com 
signals a shift within the copyright regime. This decision demonstrates a 
shift back towards the copyright formalities that Congress imposed upon 
copyright owners in early iterations of copyright acts. While the Acts of 
1909 and 1976 transitioned the copyright system towards an unconditional 
approach, the Supreme Court and Congress clearly intended for registration 
to remain a formal requirement that was necessary to bring an infringement 
action. 
However, the Supreme Court’s decision will have numerous impacts on 
copyright owners. While this decision will incentivize copyright owners to 
file for registration early, it will likely have the impact of further congesting 
the Copyright Office’s registration system. Therefore, regardless of whether 
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Congress acts and amends the Copyright Act, the Copyright Office needs to 
change its current processing system. Whether this is through technology 
updates or increased staffing, it is evident that Congress did not intend for 
owners of works to wait a year for a decision on an application that is likely 
to be approved. 
While the Court’s decision clearly supports the registration approach, 
the system should move towards a more balanced methodology. The 
adoption of a semi-conditional copyright system, through the special 
handling process, would likely alleviate many of the concerns raised by 
Petitioner while still maintaining the registration requirement. A 
semi-conditional system would allow applicants to update their applications 
to an expedited review if litigation is looming or they are being detrimentally 
affected by infringers. 
Congress would not need to recreate the wheel, but instead adopt a 
modified version of section 623 of the Copyright Office’s Compendium. By 
working together with the Copyright Office, Congress should amend the 
Copyright Act in order to align it to what is occurring in practice and 
incorporate options allowed by the Copyright Office. 
Ultimately, organizations such as Fourth Estate will need to lobby for 
Congress to amend the Copyright Act. It is unlikely that Congress will 
amend the Copyright Act so significantly otherwise. Copyright issues are 
not likely a primary concern of most legislators in this political climate. 
Therefore, in order to achieve a semi-conditional copyright approach, 
Congress will need to be persuaded. 
